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COMMENTS

PRESERVING STREAM FLOWS IN MONTANA THROUGH
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE: AN
UNDERRATED SOLUTION
Matt Clifford*
I. INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1994, Montanans were once again brought face to
face with the failure of their water laws to protect the state's rivers as
functioning natural systems. The situation was both tragic and familiar:
Record-low winter snowfalls over much of the state left spring snowpacks
in some areas at less than fifty percent of normal.' To make things worse,
warm spring temperatures and rams melted the snowpack rapidly, causing
flows m many rivers to peak well above normal levels and then plummet By early summer, when agricultural users began making the usual
withdrawals to irrigate summer crops, flows in major rivers such as the
Big Hole and Clark Fork were at roughly half of normal levels.' At about
the same time, the rams stopped, causing water levels to drop even further.
By late July, the situation in many streams was critical. The most
visible threats occurred in the Ruby River in southwestern Montana, where
sediment flushed from the bottom of the empty Ruby Reservoir killed at
least 2500 rainbow and brown trout,4 and in the Big Hole, where low
flows threatened a repeat of the disastrous summer of 1988, when the
reproductive season of the last remaining population of fluvial grayling in
the lower forty-eight states was devastated Under normal conditions, the
trout fisheries of both rivers may take years to recover. Although stopgap
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5. Telephone Interview with Pat Byorth, fisheries biologist, Mont. Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (June 20, 1995).
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efforts by state wildlife officials and some local landowners managed to
save the grayling from disaster, their long-term prospects for survival are
also uncertain.6
The cause of these dewatering problems is also familiar. As it is
currently interpreted, the law of Montana, like that of most other western
states, gives water users the right to withdraw water with no regard for the
effect their actions will have on the condition of the stream, even in times
of shortage when withdrawals will essentially dry up a stream altogether.7
Even when some of the withdrawn water manages to find its way back to
the river as underground return flows-often warmed and polluted after
percolating through chemical-rich farm soils-it is again subject to recapture and use by downstream irrigators.8
This problem, of course, is not unique to Montana. All thirteen arid
Western states recognize the prior appropriation doctrine in some form.'
In these states, including Montana, two major tools have been developed
to protect stream flows. The first is instream flow legislation, which in its
various incarnations allows rights holders to leave their water in the
stream without losing it to other appropriators. 0 The second is a hybrid
common law/constitutional remedy called the public trust doctrine.
In Montana, conservation groups have focused their recent efforts on
pushing for instream flow laws in the legislature." The primary reasons
for this approach are probably practical: the groups may well perceive that
the state supreme court is unlikely to render opinions seen as hostile to
irrigators," and in seeking legislative instream flow reform the groups
6. Id.
7. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND REsouRcEs § 5.05(2) (1994). See also
Deborah Beaumont Schmidt, The Public Trust Doctrine In Montana: Conflict At the Headwaters, 19
ENVTL. L. 675, 676 (1989).
8. Baker Ditch Co. v. Dist. Court, 824 P.2d 260 (Mont. 1992).
9. See TARLOCK, supra note 7, § 5.05(1).
10.
Montana has at least two statutory schemes that could be placed in this category. Under
one, the state may reserve water for instream flows. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (1993). However,
it may only do so prospectively; that is, it may preclude future water rights, but not existing ones. Id.
Therefore, the law provides no relief to streams that are already over-appropriated. Under another, the
state may lease water for instream flows on certain rivers. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-436 (1993).
The Montana Legislature recently expanded the state's leasing scheme, allowing private parties
to lease water from irrigators on any stream in the state. Act effective Oct. 1, 1995, ch. 322, 1995
Mont. Laws (allowing an existing appropriative water right to be temporarily changed to instrearn flow
for the benefit of the fishery).
11.
Following the election in November 1994, conservation groups dropped plans to introduce
a bill in the upcoming legislative session that would have allowed the outright sale of water rights.
Instead, the groups planned to direct their full efforts toward a less controversial proposal to expand
the state's water leasing program. Telephone interview with Bruce Farling, Executive Director, Trout
Unlimited (Aug. 8, 1995). Although these efforts ultimately met with some success, at least one prominent environmental advocate doubts that leasing alone will prove sufficient to guarantee adequate
summer flow levels in Montana streams. Id.
12. See, e.g., Brian Morris, When Rivers Run Dry Under a Big Sky: Balancing Agricultural
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can ally themselves with market-oriented conservatives such as the Political Economy Research Center in Bozeman, thereby tapping a considerable
source of intellectual horsepower and rhetoric. In addition, at least one
legal commentator has decided that the public trust doctrine in Montana
does not provide a basis for the protection of instream flows.
Whatever may be the practical merits of seeking legislative relief for
Montana's stream flow problems, as a legal proposition the public trust
doctrine deserves a second look. In the first place, interpreting the doctrine
to provide some protection for stream flows would be a logical extension
of the principles the Montana Supreme Court laid out in several decisions
in the mid-1980s. More fundamentally, the doctrine may provide a different and more widespread sort of relief to the state's creeks and rivers
than would market-oriented instream flow laws. Ultimately, this is because
the two approaches rest on fundamentally different theoretical views of the
status of rivers and water in our legal system.
This Comment assesses the prospects for protecting stream flows
through the public trust doctrine in Montana. Part II describes the history
of the doctrine and its current status in the western states. Part Im examines the current state of the doctrine in Montana, including its relationship
to provisions in the state constitution as announced by the state supreme
court. Part IV briefly analyzes a common objection to the application of
the doctrine, that it violates the eminent domain clause of the federal
constitution. Finally, Part V responds to claims, often made by economists
and economic-minded legal commentators, that market solutions necessarily provide substantively better or fairer allocations of water than do public
rights.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DocTRINE
In order to understand the role of the public trust doctrine in modem
American law, it is essential to know something of its history. Fortunately,
the surge of interest in the public trust doctrine following Professor Joseph
Sax's groundbreaking 1970 article14 has produced a wealth of literature
describing and debating the origins and history of the doctrine. 5 Drawing

Claims to Scarce Water Resources in Montana and the American West, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 259,
274 n.78 (1992) (noting changes in the Montana Supreme Court after Galt).
13. See R. Mark Josephson, Comment, An Analysis of the PotentialConflict Between the Prior
Appropriationand Public Trust Doctrines in Montana Water Law, 8 PUB. LAND L. REV. 81 (1987).
14. Joseph R. Sax, The Public Trust DoctrineIn Natural Resource Law: Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
15. See, e.g. Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Propertyand Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 633-43 (1986). For an exhaustive bibliography of the relevant literature through 1986, see id. at 643 n.75.
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heavily on this literature, this Comment will briefly trace the history of the
doctrine, noting the more controversial points.
A. Roman and English Law
Scholars uniformly trace the original germ of the public trust doctrine
to Roman law, specifically to a statement in the Institutes of Justinian:
"By natural law, these things are common property of all: air, running water, the sea, and with it the shores of the sea."16 They have debated the
significance of this simple statement at length. Some argue that it was
meant as an abstract statement of general principle-or even as an idealized description of a hypothetical state of nature" 7 -and point out that the
Romans allowed the transfer of extensive coastal areas into private
hands. " Others regard it as an important principle of Roman law, and
counter that the Romans never settled the question of who owned ocean
and river shores. 9
In any event, no one disputes that the Roman concept found its way
into feudal English law. There, it was used to justify the proposition that
the crown held title to the lands beneath all tidal waters, subject to the
public's right to use them for navigation, commerce, and fishing." The
crown lacked the power, according to this theory, to convey this public
right to private holders.2 Again, two characterizations of this doctrine
have emerged. Professor Sax sees it as an extension of Roman and medieval natural law principles protecting public access and use.22 Richard
Lazarus and others take the more cynical view that it was an attempt to
expand the reach of the king's taxing authority.23 Importantly, all agree
that the English public trust doctrine was not an absolute prohibition on
the crown's power of alienation; it could grant title to a private holder if

16.

J. INST. 2.1.1-2.1.6.

17. See Patrick Deveny, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An HistoricalAnalysis, I
SEA GRANT L.J. 13, 26-29 (1976).
18. Id. at 33-34.
19. See, e.g., Note, Private Property Rights Yield to the Environmental Crisis: Perspectives on
the Public Trust Doctrine, 41 S.C. L. REv. 897, 898-99 (1989).
20. See TARLOCK, supra note 7, §§ 3.09[3], 3.36.5.
21.
Id.
22. Some note that the public trust doctrine was prevalent in Europe throughout the Middle
Ages. For example, Spanish codes and French law provided that "the public highways and byways,
running water and springs, meadows, pasture, forests, heaths and rocks ... are not to be held by
lords.... nor are they to be maintained... in any other way than that their people may always be
able to use them." See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwatersof the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on
the Scope of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 429 (1989) (quoting M. BLOCH, FRENCH
RuRAL HISTORY 183 (1966)).
23. Lazarus, supra note 15, at 635.
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Parliament, the people's representative, consented to the transfer.24 This
would later become important to the debate over what role, if any, the
doctrine should have in the United States, where the separate voices of the
sovereign and the people became merged into a single entity, the state.
B. Early American Doctrine
After the American Revolution, the newly independent states became
the successors of the crown, and adopted the English common law. Early
on, American courts began applying the public trust doctrine, quickly
expanding its reach to include all navigable rivers and lakes, not just those
influenced by the tide. In Carson v. Blazer,' for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a private owner could not have exclusive
rights to fish in a section of the Susquehanna River.' Shortly thereafter,
in Arnold v. Mundy,27 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state
could not grant a private party the exclusive right to use oyster beds on
tidal lands."
Without a doubt, the seminal case in the history of the American
public trust doctrine was Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,29 where the
U.S. Supreme Court held that Illinois could not grant part of the Chicago
harbor to a private railroad. 0 To understand Illinois Central, however,
one must first understand the "equal footing doctrine," an implied rule of
constitutional law which provides that all new states enter the union on a
status equal to the original thirteen. The Court first articulated this doetrine in the 1845 case of Pollard'sLessee v. Hagan,3 where it ruled that
the federal government holds the land beneath navigable waters in U.S.
territories in trust for the benefit of future states. Upon statehood, each
state takes title to the land beneath navigable waters within its borders,
just as the original colonies took title to the land underlying their waters
from the English crown after the revolution.32 If the federal government
were allowed to retain title after statehood, the new state would be denied
an important benefit upon entering the union that the original thirteen had
received.33

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
hold clear

See, e.g., Deveny, supra note 17, at 49; Sax, supra note 14, at 476.
2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810).
Carson, 2 Binn. at 484.
6 NJ.L. 1 (NJ. 1821).
Arnold, 6 NJ.L. at 78, 93.
146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 460.
44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
Pollard'sLessee, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 230.
Id. More specifically, Pollardis based on the theory that the federal government could not
title because the Constitution does not grant it sovereign power over lands. When the Court
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In Illinois Central, the Illinois Legislature passed a law granting a
large part of the bed of Lake Michigan to the railroad, then passed a second law repealing the grant.34 The issue before the U.S. Supreme Court
was whether the second law was an unconstitutional impairment of a
contract obligattion. The Court upheld the second law, on the grounds that
the original conveyance was void.35 The Court found that Illinois did not
hold absolute title to the bed of the harbor, but instead held it in trust for
the benefit of its people.36 Any state attempt to sell off the lands was
void to the extent it hindered the purpose of the trust, namely public use
by the citizens of Illinois.37 Because the transfer would remove a section
of the harbor from public navigation, the Court held, it was void.
Illinois Central firmly established in American law the proposition
that certain waters are inherently important to the public, and therefore
their removal from the public domain requires something more than the
ordinary majoritarian workings of state government. Because the public's
interest in waters was primarily focused on their use as highways for
navigation and commerce, courts portrayed the public trust doctrine in the
context of easements. 39 As waterways took on new meaning and importance to American society, however, this began to change.
C. The Modern Public Trust Doctrine
In 1970, Professor Joseph Sax rekindled interest in the public trust
doctrine with the publication of his now-famous article in the Michigan
Law Review.' If the success of a law review article can be measured by
the sheer number of court decisions it inspires, this article is surely one of
the most successful in history. On its heels came a number of court decisions expanding the scope of both the waters covered by the public trust
doctrine and the uses the doctrine protects.4' Courts have found that it
applies to all waters, not just navigable ones,42 and that it protects not

later acknowledged federal plenary power over public lands, it found it necessary to distinguish between submerged lands, to which the federal government retained title, and dry lands, title to which
passed to the states. See TARLOCK, supra note 7, § 8.02[5]-[6].
34. Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 405 n.1, 410-11.
35. Id. at 460.
36. Id. at 454-55.
37. Id. at 455-56. The Court held the trust purposes to be the traditional triad of navigation,
commerce, and fishing. Id. at 452.
38. Id. at 459-60.
39. See, e.g., Drake v. Hudson River R.R., 7 Barb. 508, 547 (N.Y. App. Div. 1849) (holding
that railroad has right to use public street as a route).
40. Sax, supra note 14.
41.
The most exhaustive list of modem public trust cases through 1986 is found at Lazarus,
supra note 15, at 644 n.77.
42. See, e.g., Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1980) [herein-

1995]

PUBLIC TRUST & STREAM FLOWS

just the traditional triad of navigation, commerce, and fishing, but also
wildlife, scenic beauty, and other environmental attributes.43
Several modem cases have pitted the public trust doctrine directly
against appropriative water rights. The best known of these-and the one
in which the doctrine has been given the greatest effect against appropriative rights-is a California decision, NationalAudubon Society v. Superior
Court (Mono Lake).' In that case, environmental groups challenged the
extent of the city of Los Angeles's right to divert water from four inlet
streams of Mono Lake.4' Although these tributaries are nonnavigable, the
city's diversions had contributed to serious drops in the level of the lake,
which is navigable.' The California Supreme Court recognized that the
city had acquired a right to divert the water, but also found that the state
had a continuing duty, founded in the common law public trust doctrine,
to supervise the allocation of waters held in trust for the public.47 Because the state had failed to consider the effects on wildlife and scenery
when it granted the city's water rights in 1940, the court ordered it to
reconsider the rights, taking these values into account.'
Mono Lake is a landmark case in several ways. First, it stands as a
recognition that the public trust doctrine can apply to nonnavigable tributaries, in effect recognizing that watersheds are interconnected systems
rather than mere isolated bodies of water of varying size and importance.
Second, the Mono Lake court required, for the first time, a re-examination
of previously existing water rights to allow for modem trust values. Third,
the court suggested a workable remedy for public trust cases-remand to
an administrative agency-which allows a branch of government with
undeniably greater technical expertise than the judiciary to determine the
appropriate balance of rights. This sort of "procedural" remedy has become a trend in modem public trust cases. 49
In the arid West, where local lore often associates water disputes with
violence, the modem public trust doctrine has naturally generated a good
deal of controversy. Its advocates champion it as a means to prevent vital

after Mono Lake] (trust applies to non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters); Montana Coalition
for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984) (doctrine applies regardless of ownership of underlying streambed).
43. See, e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 720.
44. 658 P.2d 709 (1980).
45. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712.
46. Id. at711, 720.
47. Id. at 728.
48. Id. at 728-29.
49. See Michael C. Blumm, PublicPropertyand the Democratizationof Western Water Law: A
Modern View of the PublicTrust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 589-97 (1989).
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public resources from being monopolized by an elite few." Its detractors
decry it as an unprincipled way to "sacrifice the rights of some to create
rights for others."'" Even the advocates, however, have expressed concern
over the curious, quasi-constitutional status the doctrine has seemingly
acquired. Why, some have asked, should a creature of the common law be
allowed to prevent the democratically elected legislature from alienating
public resources, when the legislature ordinarily has the power to change
common law rules?52 This reasoning has led even an enthusiastic environmental advocate such as Michael Blumm to conclude that the doctrine
is on truly firm ground only when it has a constitutional basis:
[T]he common law must be subject to legislative correction. However,
the trust may constrain the legislature where it is implied in a state's
constitution, and there are some intriguing constitutional possibilities,
especially in western states, regarding water. 3
Montana's constitution is one that contains such possibilities regarding water.
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

IN MONTANA

In the mid-1980s, the Montana Supreme Court recognized and applied the public trust doctrine in three landmark decisions involving stream
access. Importantly, the court based the decisions not on the doctrine
standing alone, but also on provisions in the state constitution governing
water.
A. Montana ConstitutionalProvisions
The Montana Constitution states that "[a]ll surface, underground,
flood and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are the
property of the state for the use of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law."54 Similar provisions are
found in the constitutions of most western states.5 These provisions have
traditionally been read as establishing the prior appropriation system and

50. See, e.g., id. at 598.
51.
James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The PublicTrust Doctrine in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 567 (1989).
52. See, e.g. Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL.
W. L. REv. 239, 273-74 (1992) ("Responsible government is constantly changing the allocation of
such [public] property and with every change there is a potential public trust cause of action-for what
and subject to what rules I cannot determine.").
53. Blumm, supra note 49, at 576.
54. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
55. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
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the usufructuary nature of water rights-in other words, as providing that
any member of the public may use water, but only if she obtains a water
right under the rules established by the legislature.:5 However, western
courts have not universally limited the words to this meaning. The su" have read these sorts of
preme courts of New Mexico 7 and Wyoming58
provisions as creating a public right to use lakes and streams for recreation. These decisions predate the adoption of the 1972 Montana Constitution by a good many years.
In addition, the Montana Constitution contains language confirming
all existing appropriative rights.59 Presumably, this language elevates existing water rights to constitutional status."
Finally, the Montana Constitution contains a provision that guarantees
individuals a right to a "clean and healthful environment."' The exact
meaning of this language is not clear. Some have regarded it as a mere
statement of principle meant to guide the legislature, while others have
argued that it creates a substantive, self-executing right.' Unfortunately,
the Montana Supreme Court has done little to clarify the matter.63
B. Curran and Hildreth
The Montana Supreme Court first recognized the public trust doctrine
in the 1982 case of Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v.
Curran.' Curran, a landowner along the Dearborn River in central Montana, had attempted to prevent recreationists from floating down the river
through his land, claiming that they were trespassers. The coalition sued,
claiming a public right to use the river, and won partial summary judgment from the district court.65 On appeal by the landowner, the Montana
Supreme Court ruled for the coalition in a sweeping decision recognizing
the public's right to use for recreation all waters capable of such use.'
Although the court based its decision on both the public trust doctrine
and the constitutional language declaring public ownership of water, the

56. See TARLOCK, supra note 7, § 8.04[l].
57. State v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1945)
58. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1961).
59. The constitution provides, "All existing rights to the use of any waters for any useful or
beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and confirmed:' MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(1).
60. See General Agric. Corp. v. Moore, 534 P.2d 859, 861-62 (Mont. 1975).
61.
MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
62. See generally Tammy Wyatt-Shaw, Comment, The Doctrine of Self-Execution and the EnvironmentalProvisions of the Montana State Constitution: "They Mean Something," 15 PUB. LAND L.
REV. 219 (1994).
63. Id. at 235.
64. 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984).
65. Curran, 682 P.2d at 165.
66. Id. at 172.
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exact relationship between the two is not entirely clear in the opinion. The
court began with a detailed analysis of the question of title to the riverbed,
concluding that title to the bed vested in the state because the Dearborn
was navigable at the time of statehood under the federal log-floating
test.67 Then, citing the public trust doctrine as expressed in Illinois Central, the court determined that title to the bed remained in the state.' Finally, the court declared that ownership of the river bed was irrelevant to
the question of the public's right of use, concluding:
In essence, the question is whether the waters owned by the State under
the Constitution are susceptible to recreational use by the public. The
capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes determines their
availability for recreational use by the public. Streambed ownership by a
private party is irrelevant. If the waters are owned by the State and held
in trust for the people by the State .... [t]he Constitution and the public
trust doctrine do not permit a private party to interfere with the public's
right to recreational use of the surface of the State's waters.'
According to the court, then, its holding rested on both the public
trust doctrine and the constitution. But because its discussion of the doctrine is in the section addressing navigability for title, it was not clear that
the doctrine was relevant to the state's trust duties in waters when the
state did not own the bed under the federal navigability test, although it
seemed clear that such waters were governed by the constitution. Did the
state have a lesser trust duty in streams when it did not hold title to the
underlying land?
The court dispelled any remaining doubts on this question later the
same year in Montana Coalitionfor Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth,7' a
case with virtually identical facts except that the stream in question was
the Beaverhead River in southwestern Montana. The lower court ruled that
the defendants could not prevent the public from floating down the river
because it was navigable under the federal "pleasure boat" test. In upholding this ruling, however, the Montana Supreme Court rejected the use of
such a "narrow" test.7 The court essentially reiterated its holding in
Curran, stating:
As we held in Curran, supra, under the Public Trust Doctrine and the
1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of recre-

67. Id. at 166-68. A river is navigable in law that is navigable in fact; the fact that logs have
been floated down a river is evidence of navigability. Id. at 166.
68. Id. at 168.
69. Id. at 170.
70. 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984).
71.
Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1091.
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ational use may be so used by the public without regard to streambed
ownership or navigability for nonrecreational purposes.72
Again, the trust duty seems to be rooted in both the public trust doctrine
and the constitution, but the exact contribution of each is unclear. The
court was explicit, however, in stating the extent of the public right: The
public could engage in water-related recreation up to the ordinary highwater mark, and could go above the high-water mark onto private property
to portage around barriers in the least intrusive manner possible. The public could not, however, cross private property to gain access to the
stream. 73

C. Gait
Following Hildreth, the Montana Legislature enacted legislation intended to codify the two decisions and further define the scope of the
public right.7 This legislation allowed the public to camp and build duck
blinds and boat moorings below the high-water mark, and to hunt big
game below the high-water mark under severely limited circumstances.75
In addition, it required landowners to pay the cost of building portages
around artificial barriers in the stream.76
This legislation was challenged in Gait v. State Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks.' in which the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the law was unconstitutional as a taking of private property
without just compensation.7 The court reaffmned its holdings in Curran
and Hildreth, and struck down portions of the statute it felt went beyond
those decisions.79 It rejected the duck blind, camping, and big game hunting provisions as unnecessary to ensure recreational use in all waters." In
addition, it found that requiring landowners to pay for portages would go
too far and indeed constitute a taking.8" The court affirmed the balance of
the statute. Importantly, the court stressed the need for an approach balancing competing constitutional rights:
The real property interests of private landowners are important as are

72. Id. at 1093.
73. Id. at 1094; see also Curran, 682 P.2d at 172.
74. Act of Apr. 10, 1985, cl. 429, 1985 Mont. Laws 805; Act of Apr. 19, 1985, ch. 556, 1985
Mont. Laws 1127 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to 322 (1993)).
75. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-302(2)(d)-(f) (1985).
76. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-311(3)(e) (1993).
77. 731 P.2d 912 (Mont. 1987).
78. Gait,731 P.2d at 913.

79.

Id at 915-16.

80.
81.

Id. at 916.

Id.
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[sic] the public's property interest in water. Both are constitutionally
protected. These competing interests, when in conflict, must be reconciled to the extent possible."
D. Making Sense of Curran, Hildreth, and Galt
As interpreted in Curran,Hildreth, and Galt, Article IX, Section 3 of
the Montana Constitution creates two separate sets of rights to use the
water held in trust by the state. The first set consists of the rights of private appropriators, whose limits are set by the rules established by the
legislature. The second set consists of the public's rights, the content of
which derives from the language of the constitution as informed by the
public trust doctrine. When these sets of rights come into conflict, the
court must attempt to strike a balance that protects each to the extent
possible.
E. Future Possibilities
Although the Montana public trust cases are commonly described as
dealing with the issue of access,83 on their face they recognize the
public's right not just to pass over the water that it owns, but to use it for
recreation. Courts cannot simultaneously protect this right and allow appropriative right holders to remove all water from a stream, destroying
most of their capacity to support recreational use. For example, one of the
most important recreational uses of water in Montana (and one of the
oldest protected by the public trust doctrine) is fishing. 4 Even if
dewatering is temporary, as it often is, it can ruin a river's potential to
sustain a viable fishery. For example, stretches of the Jefferson and
Gallatin Rivers, normally fertile streams, are practically fishless because
their largest fish are killed off every few years in times of even moderate
shortage. A right to use a resource has little meaning unless it carries
with it at least a minimal assurance that the resource will not be destroyed.
Although this sort of reasoning may seem radical to some, in fact the
Montana Supreme Court has already engaged in it. In Curran, it found
that the right to recreational use of waters necessarily implies the right to
cross private property to portage around barriers.86 The court balanced the
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., John E. Thorson et al., Forging PublicRights in Montana's Waters, 6 PUB. LAND
L. REv. 1, 25-27 (1985).
84. In 1987, the estimated recreational value of stream fishing in Montana was over $122 nillion. MONT. DEP'T OF FISH, WILDLIFE AND PARKS, THE NET ECONOMIC VALUE OF FISHING IN MONTANA 28 (1987).
85.
MICHAEL S. SAMPLE, THE ANGLER'S GUIDE TO MONTANA 73, 81 (3d ed. 1989).
86. Curran, 682 P.2d at 172. Importantly, this provision appears to apply to natural as well as
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public's constitutional right to water use against landowners' real property
right to exclude, and found that the latter must yield a small amount to
preserve the former."
Similarly, one can argue persuasively that appropriative rights must
yield a small amount to protect the public use right. Currently, the aggregate diversions of appropriators effectively destroy the public right to fish
in parts of many rivers and creeks. As currently interpreted, the balance of
rights is entirely in favor of appropriators, at the expense of the public
right. Although some may point out that the public may still fish on other
stretches of these streams, or catch a few fish that wander in at times of
higher flow, this simply amounts to an observation that private users have
not completely destroyed the public right. It does not change the proposition that they have been required to give up nothing, while the public
has given up a great deal.
A more equitable balance would require each appropriator to temporarily reduce his diversion in times of shortage. Of course, this idea enrages agriculturalists, many of whom fear losing their ranches as it is. Yet
surely some balance is possible. Some rivers are tantalizingly close to
levels they need to sustain diverse life, and many are relatively healthy
except in years of true drought. For example, the Montana Department of
Fish, Wildlife and Parks estimates that the Big Hole grayling need a minimum flow of only 60 cubic feet per second (c.f.s.) in the Wisdom area to
prosper, and can survive flows as low as 20 c.f.s. in occasional drought
8
years.
This sort of balancing approach is exactly what the California Supreme Court required in Mono Lake. 9 However, its legal basis is different-and perhaps more secure-in that it rests on the state constitution
rather than the common law. This distinction is crucial, and a failure to
recognize it has led some to conclude that any balancing of public and private water rights is precluded under Montana law.' Admittedly, it is uncertain whether the Mono Lake analysis could apply directly to Montana

artificial barriers. The law upheld in Gait, MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-311 (1985), necessarily contemplated portage rights around both, since it originally required landowners to pay for portages around
only artificial barriers. MoNT CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-311(1), (3)(e) (1985). Thus, it cannot be argued that
portage rights exist only where the landowner has acted to block passage over a stream.
87. See Galt, 731 P.2d at 916.
88. Telephone Interview with Pat Byorth, supra note 5. In 1988, this stretch of river went dry

for several weeks. Id.
89. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the effects Mono Lake
has had on water allocation in California, see Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text,
Near-Text and Context, (June 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Public Land Law Review).
90. See, e.g., Josephson, supra note 13, at 105-08.
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law, since the California court based its reallocation of rights on a common-law feature of the California public trust doctrine-the "continuing
duty of supervision"-that has no current parallel in Montana, and which
would arguably be foreclosed by Article 9 of the Montana Constitution,
which affirms existing water rights. 9' However-and again, this is crucial-the Montana Supreme Court articulated the public rights set forth in
Curran, Hildreth, and Galt as constitutional rights. Thus, it is not clear
that they should be regarded as poor cousins of appropriative rights, to be
automatically trumped in the event of conflict, since both kinds of rights
derive from the same source, the Montana Constitution. When one accepts
the language of the Montana public trust decisions at face value-that is,
as creating a constitutional public trust doctrine-one can argue persuasively that the Montana Constitution does indeed call for some measure of
balance.92
IV. THE TAKINGS ISSUE
The previous section suggests that appropriators may be required to
forego some of the water to which they now consider themselves entitled
in favor of public rights. Naturally enough, many have argued that such
assertions of public rights to the detriment of private water users constitutes a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.9 3
The issue has been debated in the legal literature,94 but the discussion has been largely a theoretical one about whether such an action ought
to be considered a taking, since the federal courts have yet to find that it
is. The debate has become arguably more relevant following recent turns
in federal takings jurisprudence.9 5 As this Comment is being prepared,

91.
See id. at 106-09; but see Department of State Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948, 956-57
(Mont. 1985) (in the context of school trust lands, citing Mono Lake for the proposition that "anyone
who acquires such [trust] property do[es] so subject to the trust").
92. Two further objections to a recognition of public instrean rights are likely to be raised. The
first comes from a statement in Curran that "Curran has no right to control the use of the surface
waters of the Dearborn to the exclusion of the public except to the extent of his prior appropriation for
irrigation purposes, ... which is not at issue here." 682 P.2d at 170 (emphasis added). This statement
is, on its face, dictum; the appropriative right was not at issue. The second objection comes from Baker Ditch Co. v. Dist. Court, which held that return flows must be made available to downstream junior
water users if upstream senior water users will not be affected. 824 P.2d 260 (Mont. 1992). This case
was decided on a technical point of appropriation doctrine and did not address the issue of public
rights.
93.
See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public
Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171
(1987).
94. See, e.g., id.; Joseph L. Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L.
473 (1989).
95. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990) (holding that
denial of a permit for mining on 98 acres of a 1560-acre parcel was a compensable taking); Loveladies
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James Huffman and Hertha Lund are preparing to publish an article arguing that recent decisions support the proposition that any alteration to
existing water rights is a Fifth Amendment taking.96
The traditional analysis in public trust cases is that recognition of the
public trust does not effect a taking of private rights because any rights
contained in the trust were never part of the landowner's estate to begin
with. In Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi,97 for example, the Supreme
Court held that title to certain submerged lands was never vested in the
appellant, even though his predecessors in title (and the state) had assumed
it was and paid taxes on the lands for more than 150 years. Although
Huffman and Lund object to this analysis on fairness grounds, they seem
to admit that no court has agreed with them as yet.9"
To the extent that public rights come from state constitutions, their
exercise is not considered a taking because the court is balancing co-equal
constitutional rights against each other." Again, Huffman and Lund object that any change in the interpretation of property law should constitute
a taking; Huffman has even suggested that a constitutional amendment
abolishing the eminent domain clause would be a taking requiring the
government to compensate existing property holders.I"u Again, they cite
no court decisions that agree with this proposition.
The ability of courts to protect public rights through state constitutions and the public trust doctrine seems especially secure after the 1992
case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.' The Lucas opinion
instructs courts to look to state property law to determine whether government action has interfered with the reasonable expectations of rights holders and therefore taken their property." Looking to Montana water law,
one sees that Montana recognizes and takes seriously the public trust

Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 C1. Ct. 153 (1990) (holding that denial of permit to fill 11.5-acre

wetlands was a compensable taking).
96. James L. Huffmann & Hertha Lund, Constitutional Protections of Property Interests in
Western Water (January 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
97. 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988).
98. Huffman & Lund, supra note 96.
99. See Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1094; Gait, 731 P.2d at 916. In Mono Lake, the analysis was
somewhat opposite, but the result the same: the court found that because neither the public trust doctrine nor prior appropriative diversions created absolute rights, the state could strike a balance between
the two without effecting a taking. See Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 726-27.
100. Huffman, supra note 51, at 547 n.84 (1989). See also Josephson, supra note 13, at 108
(arguing that any change in water allocation effected by the 1972 Montana Constitution would be a
Fifth Amendment taking). Yet surely a sovereign people can change the existing scope of property
rights through constitutional reformation. If not, the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution (abolishing slavery) should have been a very expensive proposition for the federal government.
101.
112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
102. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900; see also J. Prescott Jaunich, Post-Lucas Privatizationof the
Public Trust, 15 PUB. LAND. L. REv. 167, 168-69 (1994).

PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

doctrine, and that its constitution provides that all water belongs to the
state in trust for the use of the people. The Montana Supreme Court, the
final arbiter of Montana law, has interpreted this provision as creating
public constitutional recreational use rights."3
V. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE RIGHTS: WHICH OFFER BETIER
PROTECTION?

Even if public rights are a legally plausible source of environmental
protection, some argue that they are inferior to laws providing for instream
flow rights. These laws allow a rightholder to leave her water in the
stream rather than divert it for consumptive use."° Some states have enacted such laws, but to date they allow only the state to hold instream
rights." 5 Some scholars have suggested taking this concept to its logical
conclusion and allowing rightholders to sell their rights to private conservation organizations such as the Nature Conservancy that wish to hold
them as instream flows.
This notion of water marketing has found great favor with legal
scholars who advocate so-called "free market environmentalism."'" They
argue that environmentalists have been wrong to place so much faith in
"top down" public solutions-whether they be legislative ones such as
"command and control" environmental laws, or judicial ones such as the
public trust doctrine.0 7 If the public has developed an increased appetite
for nonconsumptive uses of water, they say, fine-but why allow a legislature or judge to guess at the proper balance between public and private
demands? Why not instead establish a free market in water rights and let
the public put its money where its mouth is? This approach, they argue,
will actually lead to more environmental protection, not less, since people
tend to take better care of what they own personally than what they hold
in common with others."' And certainly there is no shortage of environmental groups able to raise money to buy instream rights."° On a practi-

103. See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text.
104. Under current prior appropriation law, of course, water left in the stream is subject to diversion by other water users, and the rightholder who leaves it in the stream risks losing her right to
abandonment. TARLOCK, supra note 7, § 5.18(1).
105. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 536.325 (1987) (allowing the state to reserve instream water for future uses).
106.

See generally TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKEr ENVIRONMENTAL-

ISM (1991).
107. Id. at 1-23, 112-114.
108. See id. at 108-09; Jaunich, supra note 102, at 189-95. The notion of the protection afforded
through private rights has been heavily influenced by Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
109. See, e.g., ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 106, at 94.
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cal level, water marketing is certain to be less controversial than public
rights, since existing users need give up water only if they choose to

sell."

0

At a fundamental theoretical level, private rights solutions are based

on a particular world view: The natural world consists of a collection of
resources that are to be divided up among human users in the most efficient way possible. Leaving water in a stream to preserve the river as a
functioning system is just one possible "use" of the water-no better or

worse than any other-that some humans might prefer. If those humans
truly prefer to have the water used in this way, they will express this
preference by paying money to buy the right to use the water in this way.
If they cannot raise the money, or are outbid by competing users, it must
mean that they did not truly want their use as badly as others wanted
theirs. In economic jargon, it would be "inefficient" to give them the
water right; that is, it would produce greater happiness in the hands of

others."'
Many environmental advocates object to this view of the natural
world. Instead, they believe that natural systems should be given an inherently higher status than competing human uses."2 In particular, they decry the use of willingness to pay as the measure of how much environmental protection is justified."' Instead, they believe that human actions
should be taken with an awareness of their effect on natural systems, and
should be tailored so as not to destroy those systems." 4 To such advocates, public rights offer important advantages over private ones: First,

they apply in all areas, not just those in which a number of humans hap110. Of course, private rights schemes are not without controversy. Most notably, agricultural
interests oppose them because they might alter the traditional agricultural character and economy of
entire regions. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 12, at 286 n.125.
111. See ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 106, at 14-15 (arguing that lack of a market system
leads consumers to demand "too much" protection for the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge). See also
Jaunich, supra note 101, at 190-91.
112. The seminal figure in this line of thought is Aldo Leopold. See, e.g., ALDO LEOPOLD, A
SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1966). See also Charles F. Wilkinson, Aldo Leopold and Western Water
Law: Thinking Perpendicularto the PriorAppropriation Doctrine, 24 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1
(1989).
113. Professor Mark Sagoff has articulated a particularly compelling attack on the notion of
willingness to pay as a catch-all measure of public resolve. He posits that when people express political views they act in the role of "citizens," as opposed to the quite different role they play as "consumers" in the marketplace. To measure the political will of citizens by the willingness to pay they express as consumers is to commit a "category mistake"--that is, to compare apples and oranges. See
MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 92-95 (1988). Other attacks on willingness to pay focus
on the sometimes considerable difference between what people are willing to pay to obtain a new benefit and what they will pay to keep a benefit they already have. This discrepancy suggests that the
notion of willingness to pay is determined more by the existing distribution of resources than anything
else. See id. at 185 n.24.
114. See Mark Sagoff, On Preserving the NaturalEnvironment, 84 YALE LJ. 205 (1974).
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pen to be interested at a given time. Moreover, they reflect the public's
reasoned collective expression of what rights ought to be, rather than
simply a measure of the shifting whim of consumer demand." 5 Finally-and this is crucial-they represent a formal acknowledgment by the
state government that it considers its waters to be more than mere spoils
to be divided up among private parties. It is impossible to know the full
effect such an acknowledgment
has on shaping public attitudes, but it may
16
considerable.'
be
Theory aside, what sorts of environmental relief would private and
public fights solutions provide? Private rights would certainly provide
relief on large, well-known streams that currently receive heavy human
use. For example, fly-fishing organizations such as Trout Unlimited-surely among the major interested conservation groups-tend to focus
their attention on certain sections of major streams such as the Big Hole,
Bitterroot, and Madison Rivers. These stretches would likely be protected,
as would those containing well-known "poster child" species such as the
fluvial grayling. But would anyone protect the myriad smaller creeks
where only a few solitary fishermen go, or where no one currently goes
because they are usually dried up and no one is used to thinking of them
as fisheries at all?" 7 If not, says the market, then good-protecting these
streams would not be efficient. But conservationists may not be satisfied
with this answer.
Public rights, on the other hand, seem much better poised to provide
widespread protection of stream flows. The flow of virtually every stream
in the state is monitored by irrigation districts,"' and the state Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks has extensive knowledge of what conditions fish and other animals need to survive. This knowledge could be harnessed to determine what minimum summer levels are necessary to preserve the public right, and which irrigators would be required to forego
how much water in the adjudication process to guarantee these levels. This
might well lead to the preservation of all, or most, of the state's river

115. See SAGOFF, supra note 113, at 51-57. Free market advocates belittle such notions as thin
disguises for the public's real motivation: greed. For example: "Why not pay?... [tihe only explanation is that it is expensive to pay and we would rather get our public benefits for nothing." Huffman,
supra note 93, at 572.
116. See Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936 (1991). "[Plrivate preferences and public values are
not static, but rather partially forged by the ongoing content and experience of public policy itself." Id.
at 937.
117. For a comprehensive catalogue of such streams-whether healthy, damaged, or destroyed-see JomN HOLT, A MONTANA FLYFISHING GUIDE (1995).
118. Admittedly, the current system of data collection would have to be greatly expanded, since
Montana does not require appropriators to install measuring devices on their individual diversions. See
Morris, supra note 12, at 292 n.150.
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systems.
VI. CONCLUSION

Whatever the political merits of the public trust doctrine and public
water rights in general may be in Montana, as a legal proposition they
represent a viable extension of principles endorsed by the state supreme
court. Because they are consistent with constitutional principles, and because they may be the best way to preserve and restore the health of the
countless streams that are so important to the state and its citizens, public
rights should be given a closer look in Montana.

